Reading Lyotard The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge - Irfan Ajvazi by Ajvazi, Irfan
Reading Lyotard The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge - Irfan Ajvazi 
Lyotard characterized the postmodern era as one that has lost faith in all grand, totalizing \"metanarratives\"—the 
abstract ideas in terms of which thinkers since the time of the Enlightenment have attempted to construct 
comprehensiveexplanations of historical experience. Disillusioned with the grandiose claims of metanarratives such 
as \"reason,\" \"truth,\" and \"progress,\" the postmodern age has turned to smaller, narrower petits récits(\"little 
narratives\"), such as the history of everyday life and of marginalized groups. In his most important philosophical 
work, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute(1983), Lyotard compared discourses to \"language games,\" a notion 
developed in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein(1889–1951); like language games, discourses are discrete 
systems of rule-governed activity involving language. Because there is no common set of assumptions in terms of 
which their conflicting claims or viewpoints can be adjudicated (there is no universal \"reason\" or \"truth\"), 
discourses are for the most part incommensurable. The basic imperative of postmodern politics, therefore, is to 
create communities in which the integrity of different language games is respected—communities based on 
heterogeneity, conflict, and \"dissensus.\"
[. . . ] Science has always been in conflict with narratives. Judged by the yardstick of science, the majority of them 
prove to be fables. But to the extent that science does not restrict itself to stating useful regularities and seeks the 
truth, it is obliged to legitimate the rules of its own game. It then produces a discourse of legitimation with respect to 
its own status, a discourse called philosophy. I will use the term modern to designate any science that legitimates 
itself with reference to a metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the 
dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation 
of wealth. For example, the rule of consensus between the sender and addressee of a statement with truth-value is 
deemed acceptable if it is cast in terms of a possible unanimity between rational minds: this is the Enlightenment 
narrative, in which the hero of knowledge works toward a good ethico-political end – universal peace. As can be 
seen from this example, if a metanarrative implying a philosophy of history is used to legitimate knowledge, 
questions are raised concerning the validity of the institutions governing the social bond: these must be legitimated 
as well. Thus justice is consigned to the grand narrative in the same way as truth.
Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward meta-narratives. This incredulity is 
undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it. To the obsolescence of 
the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of 
the university institution which in the past relied on it. The narrative function is losing its functors, its great hero, its 
great dangers, its great voyages, its great goal. It is being dispersed in clouds of narrative language elements – 
narrative, but also denotative, prescriptive, descriptive, and so on. Conveyed within each cloud are pragmatic 
valencies specific to its kind. Each of us lives at the intersection of many of these. However, we do not necessarily 
establish stable language combinations, and the properties of the ones we do establish are not necessarily 
communicable.
Thus the society of the future falls less within the province of a Newtonian anthropology (such as stucturalism or 
systems theory) than a pragmatics of language particles. There are many different language games – a heterogeneity 
of elements. They only give rise to institutions in patches – local determinism.
The decision makers, however, attempt to manage these clouds of sociality according to input/output matrices, 
following a logic which implies that their elements are commensurable and that the whole is determinable. They 
allocate our lives for the growth of power. In matters of social justice and of scientific truth alike, the legitimation of 
that power is based on its optimizing the system’s performance – efficiency. The application of this criterion to all of 
our games necessarily entails a certain level of terror, whether soft or hard: be operational (that is, commensurable) 
or disappear.
The logic of maximum performance is no doubt inconsistent in many ways, particularly with respect to 
contradiction in the socio-economic field: it demands both less work (to lower production costs) and more (to lessen 
the social burden of the idle population). But our incredulity is now such that we no longer expect salvation to rise 
from these inconsistencies, as did Marx.
Still, the postmodern condition is as much a stranger to disenchantment as it is to the blind positivity of 
delegitimation. Where, after the metanarratives, can legitimacy reside? The operativity criterion is technological; it 
has no relevance for judging what is true or just. Is legitimacy to be found in consensus obtained through discussion, 
as Jurgen Habermas thinks? Such consensus does violence to the heterogeneity of language games. And invention is 
always born of dissension. Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities; it refines our sensitivity to 
differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not the expert’s homology, but 
the inventor’s paralogy.
Here is the question: is a legitimation of the social bond, a just society, feasible in terms of a paradox analogous to 
that of scientific activity? What would such a paradox be?
Among the metanarratives are reductionism and teleological notions of human history such as those of the 
Enlightenment and Marxism. These have become untenable, according to Lyotard, by technological progress in the 
areas of communication, mass media and computer science. Techniques such as artificial intelligence and machine 
translation show a shift to linguistic and symbolic production as central elements of the postindustrial economy and 
the related postmodern culture, which had risen at the end of the 1950s after the reconstruction of western Europe. 
The result is a plurality of language-games (a term coined by Wittgenstein[4]), without any overarching structure. 
Modern science thus destroys its own metanarrative.
In the book, Lyotard professes a preference for this plurality of small narratives that compete with each other, 
replacing the totalitarianism of grand narratives. For this reason, The Postmodern Condition has often been 
interpreted as an excuse for unbounded relativism, which for many has become a hallmark of postmodern thought.
[3] Though upon a closer reading of Lyotard's text one will find that there is no such notion of the aforementioned 
relativism.
The Postmodern Condition was written as a report on the influence of technology on the notion of knowledge in 
exact sciences, commissioned by the Québec government. Lyotard later admitted that he had a 'less than limited' 
knowledge of the science he was to write about, and to compensate for this knowledge, he 'made stories up' and 
referred to a number of books that he hadn't actually read. In retrospect, he called it 'a parody' and 'simply the worst 





Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives. This incredulity is 
undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it. To the obsolescence 
of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy 
and of the university institution which in the past relied on it. The narrative function is losing its functors, its 
great hero, its great dangers, its great voyages, its great goal. It is being dispersed in clouds of narrative 
language elements--narrative, but also denotative, prescriptive, descriptive, and so on [...] Where, after the 
metanarratives, can legitimacy reside? - Jean-Francois Lyotard
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In a more polemically written afterword, entitled (after Kant’s epochal essay on Enlightenment) \"Answering the 
Question: What Is Postmodernism?\" Lyotard makes his own views clearer. He argues against the German 
sociologist Jürgen Habermas, the last representative of the Frankfurt School and therefore of the idealist tradition, a 
thinker who moreover attacked postmodern philosophers like Derrida and Foucault as \"conservatives\" for 
challenging such progressive projects of modernity as liberalism and Marxism. Lyotard turns the charge back, 
effectively accusing Habermas of Stalinism:
When power assumes the name of a party, realism and its neoclassical complement triumph over the experimental 
avant-garde by slandering and banning it—that is, provided the \"correct\" images, the \"correct\" narratives, the 
\"correct\" forms which the party requests, selects, and propagates can find a public to desire them as the appropriate 
remedy for the anxiety and depression that public experiences.
In a more polemically written afterword, entitled (after Kant’s epochal essay on Enlightenment) \"Answering the 
Question: What Is Postmodernism?\" Lyotard makes his own views clearer. He argues against the German 
sociologist Jürgen Habermas, the last representative of the Frankfurt School and therefore of the idealist tradition, a 
thinker who moreover attacked postmodern philosophers like Derrida and Foucault as \"conservatives\" for 
challenging such progressive projects of modernity as liberalism and Marxism. Lyotard turns the charge back, 
effectively accusing Habermas of Stalinism:
When power assumes the name of a party, realism and its neoclassical complement triumph over the experimental 
avant-garde by slandering and banning it—that is, provided the \"correct\" images, the \"correct\" narratives, the 
\"correct\" forms which the party requests, selects, and propagates can find a public to desire them as the appropriate 
remedy for the anxiety and depression that public experiences.
If The Postmodern Condition dwells, sometimes incomprehensibly (not to mention fraudulently), on science, its 
afterword more credibly discusses art. Lyotard sees the modern and the postmodern as perennial conditions or poles 
of an opposition within the modern period as a whole: \"The postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts 
forward the unpresentable in presentation itself.\" The moderns posit wholeness, either a wholeness lost to time or 
one to come in a utopian future; the postmoderns, by contrast, know that humanity never was or could be whole, and 
that any attempt to make it so will only end in some kind of totalitarian dystopia.
Montaigne’s essays, he says, are postmodern, while Schlegel’s fragments are modern, presumably—he doesn’t 
elaborate—because Montaigne playfully writes his own uncertainty into the text while Schlegel portentously evokes 
the totality of which his discourse is only a scattering. Malevich with his solemn God-shaped hole of a black canvas 
is a modernist, Duchamp with his witty interrogation of the art institution a postmodernist; Hegel and his syntheses 
are modernist, Kant and his antinomies postmodernist. In the lengthiest comparison, he gives us Proust the 
modernist—nostalgic for a lost paradise written up in a still-referential and stylistically unified prose—and Joyce the 
postmodernist—exposing the inadequacy of all signs in a language calling constant ludic attention to its 
performance. He concludes with the force of a manifesto:
Finally, it must be clear that it is our business not to supply reality but to invent allusions to the conceivable which 
cannot be presented. And it is not to be expected that this task will effect the last reconciliation between language 
games (which, under the name of faculties, Kant knew to be separated by a chasm), and that only the transcendental 
illusion (that of Hegel) can hope to totalize them into a real unity. But Kant also knew that the price to pay for such 
an illusion is terror. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given us as much terror as we can take. We have 
paid a high enough price for the nostalgia of the whole and the one, for the reconciliation of the concept and the 
sensible, of the transparent and the communicable experience. Under the general demand for slackening and for 
appeasement, we can hear the mutterings of the desire for a return of terror, for the realization of the fantasy to seize 
reality. The answer is: Let us wage a war on totality; let us be witnesses to the unpresentable; let us activate the 
differences and save the honor of the name.
Lyotard criticizes metanarratives such as reductionism and teleological notions of human history such as those of the 
Enlightenment and Marxism, arguing that they have become untenable because of technological progress in the 
areas of communication, mass media and computer science. Techniques such as artificial intelligence and machine 
translation show a shift to linguistic and symbolic production as central elements of the postindustrial economy and 
the related postmodern culture, which had risen at the end of the 1950s after the reconstruction of western Europe. 
The result is a plurality of language-games (a term coined by Ludwig Wittgenstein[1]: 67 ), of different types of 
argument. At the same time, the goal of truth in science is replaced by \"performativity\" and efficiency in the 
service of capital or the state, and science produces paradoxical results such as chaos theory, all of which undermine 
science's grand narrative.[2]Lyotard professes a preference for this plurality of small narratives that compete with 
each other, replacing the totalitarianism of grand narratives.
In The Postmodern Condition Jean-Francois Lyotard extends that analysis to postmodernism by looking at the status 
uf science, technology, and the arts, the significance of technocracy, and the way the flow of information and 
knowledge are controlled in the Western world. Lyotard emphasized language; the world of postmodern knowledge 
can be represented as a game of language where speaking is participation in the game whose goal is the creation of 
new and ever-changing social linkages.
Postmodernism would then be undone by a single formula. But explaining the origin of fundamental particles would 
not the explain the whole subsequent development of the universe; the equation would have to be \"run\" to 
determine that, and wouldn’t doing so demand the power of the whole universe, and create a new universe in turn? 
I’m running back again into Lyotard’s arguments. His (anti-)system is impervious even to a TOE. To him it is still 
never enough. There will always be a scientific frontier. Such is the restlessness of humanity, and our great Mother 
Nature. Heraclitus all the way.
Lyotard introduces the concept that the grand unifying narratives that have justified the pursuit of knowledge are 
being questioned by postmodern science, which does not seek to produce useful knowledge; speculative knowledge 
that seeks Truth; or knowledge that will emancipate mankind. Rather it is best understood as playing a 
Wittgenstenian series of language games, looking to create multiple, localized communities that play by their own 
(incompatible) series of rules. The postmodern, he thus contends, pushes for novelty, for an exploration of new 
\"moves\" or new \"rules\" that can participate in these games. Its aim is not consensus, and it celebrates rather than 
mourns the loss of the earlier narratives of unified endeavor. 
The author does purposely conflate justice, truth and knowledge in order to show the paradox that we are in. He’ll 
say something along the lines that as soon as we describe the world with a narrative we lose knowledge. He knows 
that we create the narrative while we leave Plato’s cave and that ‘men yearn for narratives and fail to recognize 
knowledge. Knowledge is thus founded on the narrative of its own martyrdom’.
Post-modernist know that what people believe is a function of the narrative they have and that there is no meta-
narrative that makes our beliefs universal, necessary and certain.
Post Modernism’ literally means ‘after modernism’. It is not an affirmation in itself. It is only a negation of 
something that was and indicates nothing about what it is. This author adds a little structure to that which has no 
structure by making post-modernism being narratives absent of meta-narratives. That is there is no narrative for the 
narrative itself. The world you are thrown into has no meaning beyond the meaning that you make of it through 
yourself and by your own devices from being-in-the-world while being part-of-the-world. The ultimate word game 
of word games is that it is up to you to figure this out for yourself. The author will point out that any change to the 
‘rules of the game’ changes the game into another game.
Lyotard defines Postmodern thought in contrast to modernism. Modernism, he claims, is \". . .any science that 
legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse of this kind [i.e., philosophy:] making an explicit appeal to some 
grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or 
working subject, or the creation of wealth.\" Postmodernism, in turn, is \". . .incredulity toward metanarratives.\" 
Science and technology, especially information sciences based on computers, are increasingly an important 
commodity and the focus of worldwide competition. Knowledge and political power have become linked. Thus: 
\". . .[W:]ho decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided? In the computer age, the 
question of knowledge is now more than ever a question of government.\" 
Lyotard argues that the Postmodern moment should emphasize \"paralogy,\" or dissensus. He argues: \". . .it is now 
dissension that must be emphasized. Consensus is a horizon that is never reached. Research that takes place under 
the aegis of a paradigm tends to stabilize; it is like the exploitation of a technology, economic, or artistic 'idea.'\" 
Postmodern science, in his view, encompasses: \"The function of differential or imaginative or paralogical activity 
of the current pragmatics of science is to point out these. . .'presuppositions and to petition the players to accept 
different ones. The only legitimation that can make this kind of request admissible is that it will generate ideas, in 
other words, new statements.\" Thus, new statements, new presuppositions maintain science as an open system of 
discourse, characterized by paralogy (dissensus) as individuals strive to generate new knowledge, not imprisoned by 
existing consensus on what one should study and how one should study it. 
Lyotard makes a distinction between narratives and science, where narratives are apparently the manner in which 
older societies organized themselves. By focusing on \"popular sayings, proverbs, and maxims,\" he argues that it is 
narratives that consume/elide history, while Science preserves it, bringing along with it baggage from previous 
work:
[For narratives,] In their prosody can be recognized the mark of that strange temporalization that jars the golden rule 
of our knowledge: \"never forget\"... The narratives' reference may seem to belong to the past, but in reality it is 
always contemporaneous with the act of recitation (22)
[For Science, the] knowledge that has accumulated in the form of already accepted statements can always be 
challenged. But conversely, any new statement that contradicts a previously approved statement regarding the same 
referent can be accepted as valid only if it refutes the previous statement by producing arguments and proofs. The 
game of science thus implies a diachronic temporality, that is, a memory and a project. The current sender of a 
scientific statement is supposed to be acquainted with previous statements concerning its referent (bibliography) 
and, only proposes a new statement on the subject if it differs from the previous ones. (26)
Lyotard's distinction seems based on an idealized view of science drawn from philosophers, like when he says: \"A 
statement of science gains no validity from the fact of being reported. Even in the case of pedagogy, it is taught only 
if it is still verifiable in the present through argumentation and proof. In itself, it is never secure from falsification.
\" (26)
At the same time, there are many notions of \"narrative\" which don't dispense with history that easily - consider the 
academic field of History or judicial traditions that are definitely non-static like rabbinic Judaism. While these 
might place themselves as continuing in the line of those who came before, scientists certainly see themselves as 
standing on the shoulders of giants too, so not sure that's enough for a distinction based on history. There's also a 
risk of equivocation - although the narratives Lyotard focuses to make his point about time are like aphorisms, he 
later includes television appearances by scientists as narratives too (27). These don't in any obvious way have the 
same relationship to time as the aphorism.
The supposed historic distinction between narratives and science isn't supported by a detailed historic analysis, of 
course]
B. Three narratives of legitimation of Science
For Lyotard, while each science should be thought of as a distinct language game (drawing on Wittgenstein), each 
science still requires a narrative for its own legitimations
[An aside:
Interestingly, in his introduction, Frederic Jameson writes \"Legitimation becomes visible as a problem and an 
object of study only at the point in which it is called into question\" (viii), while for Lyotard, \"It is not inconceivable 
that the recourse to narrative is inevitable, at least to the extent that the language game of science desires its 
statements to be true but does not have the resources to legitimate their truth on its own. If this is the case, it is 
necessary to admit an irreducible need for history understood, as outlined above - not as a need to remember or to 
project (a need for historicity, for accent), but on the contrary as a need to forget\" (28).
For Jameson, what is a contingent state of needing legitimation seems for Lyotard to always come with the territory. 
In addition, the claim that narratives are associated with forgetfulness is assumed again, and as before I think this 
needs support, although it might be on to something]
Lyotard argues that there are two narratives of legitimation that used to be available:
1. Science as liberation for people, where \"The subject... is humanity as the hero of liberty\" (31)
2. A philosophical metanarrative that unites not only the different disciplines, but located each with respect to the 
other, and located all of them in relation to appropriate action.
The argument has in mind Hegel, the setting up of the university of Berlin, and Humboldt (33), for example:
...the Bildung aimed for by Humboldt's project, which consists not only in the acquisition of learning by individuals, 
but also in the training of a fully legitimated subject of knowledge and society. Humboldt therefore invokes a Spirit 
(what Fichte calls Life), animated by three ambitions, or better, by a single, threefold aspiration: \"that of deriving 
everything from an original principle\" (corresponding to scientific activity), \"that of relating everything to an 
ideal\" (governing ethical and social practice), and \"that of unifying this principle and this ideal in a single 
Idea\" (ensuring that the scientific search for true causes always coincide with the pursuit of just ends in moral and 
political life). This ultimate synthesis constitutes the legitimate subject. (33)
In a complicated way, unlike #1 where science's legitimation was for man's sake, this is more science for its own 
sake:
Research and the spread of learning are not justified by invoking a principle of usefulness. The idea is not at all that 
science should serve the interests of the State and/or civil society. The humanist principle that humanity rises up in 
dignity and freedom through knowledge is left by the wayside. German idealism has recourse to a metaprinciple that 
simultaneously grounds the development of learning, of society, and of the State in the realization of the \"life\" of a 
Subject, called \"divine Life\" by Fichte and \"Life of the spirit\" by Hegel. In this perspective, knowledge first finds 
legitimacy within itself, and it is knowledge that is entitled to say what the State and what Society are. But it can 
only play this role by changing levels, by ceasing to be simply the positive knowledge of its referent (nature, society, 
the State, etc.), becoming in addition to that the knowledge of the knowledge of the referent - that is, by becoming 
speculative. In the names \"Life\" and \"Spirit,\" knowledge names itself. (34-5)
True knowledge, in this perspective, is always indirect knowledge; it is composed of reported statements that are 
incorporated into the metanarrative of a subject that guarantees their legitimacy. 
Although Wittgenstein himself did not see legitimation as involving performativity (performance/power?) work is 
legitimized. I think by \"performativity\", what is meant is simply performance/success, particularly success in the 
ability to produce consensus about reality, through the production of reality itself. After all, earlier Lyotard draws 
from Bachelard to state:
a referent is that which is susceptible to proof and can be used as evidence in a debate. Not: I can prove something 
because reality is the way I say it is. But: as long as I can produce proof, it is permissible to think that reality is the 
way I say it is. (24)
This changes education:
If the performativity of the supposed social system is taken as the criterion of relevance (that is, when the 
perspective of systems theory is adopted), higher education becomes a subsystem of the social system, and the same 
performativity criterion is applied to each of these problems. The desired goal becomes the optimal contribution of 
higher education to the best performativity of the social system. (48)
What is transmitted in higher learning? In the case of professional training, and limiting ourselves to a narrowly 
functionalist point of view, an organized stock of established knowledge is the essential thing that is transmitted. 
The application of new technologies to this stock may have a considerable impact on the medium of communication. 
It does not seem absolutely necessary that the medium be a lecture delivered in person by a teacher in front of silent 
students, with questions reserved for sections or \"practical work\" sessions run by an assistant. To the extent that 
learning is translatable into computer language and the traditional teacher is replaceable by memory banks, didactics 
can be entrusted to machines linking traditional memory banks (libraries, etc.) and computer data banks to 
intelligent terminals placed at the students' disposal. (50)
C. Making \"systems\" complicated
However, Lyotard seems to want to make a distinction between enhancing productivity as a legitimation narrative, 
and the actual possibility of production-enhancement using bureaucratic control. He insists that total control would 
reduce productivity of the system. This explains \"the weakness of state and socioeconomic bureaucracies: they 
stifle the systems or subsystems they control and asphyxiate themselves in the process.\" (55-56)
Therefore technocrats who pretend to speak on behalf of a whole system, made up of multiple, incommensurable 
language games are simply demonstrating hubris: \"What their \"arrogance\" means is that they identify themselves 
with the social system conceived as a totality in quest of its most performative unity possible. If we look at the 
pragmatics of science, we learn that such an identification is impossible.\" (63)
[As someone alien to the tradition of German idealism, this seems to be a lot of a-historic history deployed to 
support (what seems to me to be) equivocating over-generalizations. In addition, if the sections of this summary 
seems somewhat disconnected, that's because that's my understanding. For my part, either because of sytlistic 
failings or my own, I find the text insufficiently clear or careful to be of too much value, at least now (since so much 
great work has been done in the Social Studies of Science), although the question of how culture/economics shapes 
knowledge is still fascinating and important.
The introductory essay by Jameson was incredibly valuable to place this work in context - when read after reading 
Lyotard's test. For example, he points out that Lyotard locates postmodernism too close to high modernism, 
indicating disagreement over how to conceptualize postmodernism.
The postmodern world then is that which seeks to present the unpresentable. There's an inherent kind of humility in 
the approach, a recognition that all knowledge is not available to us, that we will constantly be reforming our 
perspective on our world. So Lyotard concludes then with a call to eschew totality and \"activate differences.\" For it 
is through the differences, not the totalities, he argues, that we will enhance our knowledge of the world.
The mourning modernity of 1930s is marked by secularism, and hence is a eulogy for the death of religion per se. 
During this period, the new secularist values of modernity have not yet been exhausted, and meta-narratives that 
become utopias in the ‘postmodern’ age, are still available to the critiques of modernity. Thus Marxism and 
anarchism remain alternative realities for the people of 1930s, even though they cease to be credible for the 
frustrated generation of revolutionaries that Lyotard is a part of. It is in this era that capitalism acquires a truly 
global shape and the emergence of post-Fordist production relegates the dreams of the proletarian revolution. In The 
Postmodern Condition Lyotard is mourning not for the death of religion, or tradition, but for the removal of hope 
from the world. 
However, I agree with Jameson’s criticism that Lyotard’s mourning is in some senses premature: the prevalence of 
contradiction is not a new development – it is the push factor in Hegel’s dialectics, and goes hand in hand with 
capitalism. Yes, the proletariat has taken a different shape with post-Fordism, but the power dynamics that effected 
Marxism are still present, and it is these power dynamics that have to be attended to. Eventually, the solution to the 
problems of late capitalism may not be universal, but mending each particular will give the universal a new face, 
thereby ousting the need for a meta-narrative in unifying against the imbalances of today’s system.
What are metanarratives? They are the stories modern science or its philosophical and political partisans have told to 
legitimate itself before the public, i.e., though he doesn't quite put it this way, the Enlightenment. They are 
metanarratives because they provide a narrative justification for science, which is not itself narrative but a set of 
procedures for producing statements about physical reality that correspond to that reality. Lyotard singles out two 
such Enlightenment metanarratives, the political and the philosophical. In the political story, humanity through 
education becomes more and more informed about the truth of the world and therefore more and more able to 
govern itself as a free citizenry in a free society. The philosophical narrative is the political narrative spiritualized, as 
it were, in Hegel and other idealist philosophers, who believe in the progressive self-conscious realization of our 
own capacity for freedom. 
These metanarratives, however, did not result in the promised liberation. Instead, they promulgated what Lyotard, 
with a backward glance at the Jacobins, calls the \"terror\" of silencing all dissent and exterminating all alternatives; 
they lead, in other words, to imperialism, fascism, and Stalinism. But this isn't the only reason to abandon them and 
take up \"incredulity\" instead, nor even the main reason Lyotard gives in this book, though it is the most ethically 
and politically consequential. The actual practice of science, he writes, as well as the economies of the developed 
nations, are more and more devoted to language, in the form of computer code, cybernetics, informatics, fractal 
geometry, and the like, all fields requiring the production, manipulation, or analysis of sign-systems to operate. With 
recourse to the later Wittgenstein, Lyotard argues that as these scientific fields define more and more of our lives, 
we will come to recognize not one single metanarrative but rather a plurality of \"language games,\" each with its 
own rules, as defining the future. In this technological pluralism is implied a corresponding social and cultural 
diversity, a thousand flowers blooming in the cracked edifice of Enlightenment.
These language-games will be justified not by metanarratives but by what he calls \"pragmatics\" or 
\"performativity,\" by which he means their ability to accomplish certain ends. \"Does it work?\" becomes a more 
important question than \"What does it mean?\" or \"Is it true?\" As this increasingly computerized society 
empowers the multinational corporation to become sovereign as the master of this technology, the nation-state itself, 
whose natal citizenry was the hero of the Enlightenment metanarrative, wanes in importance as a plurality and 
diversity of practices spreads over the globe. What the metanarratives of science have suppressed—narrative itself, 
for one, which Lyotard argues oriented traditional and indigenous cultures in their cosmos without the need for 
progressive teleological metanarratives—can re-emerge and the terror of silencing may be a thing of the past. All 
manner of previously authoritative institutions will likewise collapse; he foresees, for example, the demise of the 
traditional university—itself the inaugural seat of idealism's philosophical metanarrative—in favor of a hub where 
students can be taught to access relevant information and compose their own codes. 
Whether these are positive or negative developments, he doesn't fully say. On the one hand, his evocation of 
indigenous narrative vs. imperial metanarrative suggests a progressive hope in postmodern \"incredulity\" to liberate 
previously suppressed peoples; on the other hand, he's clear about the nexus of money and power that a tech-
dominated and corporate-led global society will require, surely an anti-democratic feature of the coming landscape.
In a more polemically written afterword, entitled (after Kant's epochal essay on Enlightenment) \"Answering the 
Question: What Is Postmodernism?\" Lyotard makes his own views clearer. He argues against the German 
sociologist Jürgen Habermas, the last representative of the Frankfurt School and therefore of the idealist tradition, a 
thinker who moreover attacked postmodern philosophers like Derrida and Foucault as \"conservatives\" for 
challenging such progressive projects of modernity as liberalism and Marxism. Lyotard turns the charge back, 
effectively accusing Habermas of Stalinism:
When power assumes the name of a party, realism and its neoclassical complement triumph over the experimental 
avant-garde by slandering and banning it—that is, provided the \"correct\" images, the \"correct\" narratives, the 
\"correct\" forms which the party requests, selects, and propagates can find a public to desire them as the appropriate 
remedy for the anxiety and depression that public experiences.
If The Postmodern Condition dwells, sometimes incomprehensibly (not to mention fraudulently), on science, its 
afterword more credibly discusses art. Lyotard sees the modern and the postmodern as perennial conditions or poles 
of an opposition within the modern period as a whole: \"The postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts 
forward the unpresentable in presentation itself.\" The moderns posit wholeness, either a wholeness lost to time or 
one to come in a utopian future; the postmoderns, by contrast, know that humanity never was or could be whole, and 
that any attempt to make it so will only end in some kind of totalitarian dystopia.
Montaigne's essays, he says, are postmodern, while Schlegel's fragments are modern, presumably—he doesn't 
elaborate—because Montaigne playfully writes his own uncertainty into the text while Schlegel portentously evokes 
the totality of which his discourse is only a scattering. Malevich with his solemn God-shaped hole of a black canvas 
is a modernist, Duchamp with his witty interrogation of the art institution a postmodernist; Hegel and his syntheses 
are modernist, Kant and his antinomies postmodernist. In the lengthiest comparison, he gives us Proust the 
modernist—nostalgic for a lost paradise written up in a still-referential and stylistically unified prose—and Joyce the 
postmodernist—exposing the inadequacy of all signs in a language calling constant ludic attention to its 
performance. He concludes with the force of a manifesto:
Finally, it must be clear that it is our business not to supply reality but to invent allusions to the conceivable which 
cannot be presented. And it is not to be expected that this task will effect the last reconciliation between language 
games (which, under the name of faculties, Kant knew to be separated by a chasm), and that only the transcendental 
illusion (that of Hegel) can hope to totalize them into a real unity. But Kant also knew that the price to pay for such 
an illusion is terror. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given us as much terror as we can take. We have 
paid a high enough price for the nostalgia of the whole and the one, for the reconciliation of the concept and the 
sensible, of the transparent and the communicable experience. Under the general demand for slackening and for 
appeasement, we can hear the mutterings of the desire for a return of terror, for the realization of the fantasy to seize 
reality. The answer is: Let us wage a war on totality; let us be witnesses to the unpresentable; let us activate the 
differences and save the honor of the name.
If I have summarized this difficult and somewhat hoaxing book persuasively, how does it help us with our opening 
questions? On the political coordinates of postmodernism, Lyotard's argument, for all its voguish cyber-talk, is 
remarkably congruent with Cold War anti-communism and the even older traditions of moderation out of which it 
grows; with the disparagement of \"terror\" and warnings about abstract idealism, we might be reading a more up-to-
date Albert Camus or Hannah Arendt, not to mention Edmund Burke, but without the crucial dimension of these 
thinkers' recourse to art and nature and the civic, which Lyotard replaces with the unrepresentable sublime of a 
world no mind can apprehend. The valorization of self-consciously pluralized language-games in the name of the 
\"silenced\" is a sentimental post-'60s multiculturalist take not only on Wittgenstein but on Nietzsche's rather colder 
perspectivism and aestheticism. 
None of this is objectionable, since the experiences of imperialism, fascism, and Stalinism should make us cautious 
about totalizing political and technological initiatives. But at this strange crossroads where Burke's exaltation of 
\"little platoons\" meets Toni Morrison's elegy for \"discredited knowledges,\" Lyotard gives away too much. For as 
illegitimate as one may find the modern state, it's more accountable than its would-be replacement in the 
multinational corporation, and its laws are the only guarantors of pluralism (besides sheer force) in the form of 
rights. William Gibson exposed Lyotard's pitch for cyber-diversification in the global company town as dystopia 
only a few years after The Postmodern Condition was published; we confirm its disadvantages—censorious, 
manipulative, exploitative, surveillant—every day of our 21st-century lives. Finally, for someone who wants to 
\"wage war on totality\" and make fun of Stalinist criticism, Lyotard is suspiciously eager to pass definitive 
judgments, as if there were not other ways to read Hegel, Proust, or Joyce. 
Despite its reputation as helping to put the concept of \"postmodernism\" on the conceptual map, Lyotard's book is 
probably too idiosyncratic to be exhaustive. But on its evidence, we might say that postmodernism was a partially 
justified conservative revolt that unfortunately ended up emboldening authorities who threaten to become as 
totalitarian as those it criticized; that we are still postmodern insofar as it names the condition of a corporate, digital, 
and at least officially pluralist society; and that its assault on the modern was too indiscriminate, striking through 
imposition and terror to cut down order and beauty too.
For Lyotard, the age of the ‘universal’ the ‘one-transcending-truth’ ‘I-understood-it-all’ fell down to let us swaying 
on unstable grounds. So what now? Will we rebuild once again our way to truth, a universal truth even? Or will we 
stay busy with local truths? 
Lyotard posits that it's not as much a question of who controls knowledge, but who owns the technology to more 
efficiently ascertain information at a swifter pace through having the best equipment. The best equipment is an issue 
of class and state due to its inherently expensive price, leading there to be a new duality present during the 
technological boom we're in: 1) We have more access to information than ever before, rendering most of academia 
obsolete. This also leads to a new understanding of knowledge entirely. Now it's no longer about who is an expert in 
incredibly specific fields of study but who comprehensively and efficiently can utilize the new metalanguage of 
knowledge acquisition within cyberspace.
Lyotard distinguishes differences between narrative knowledge and scientific knowledge in terms of their 
legitimized rules, or language games. The radical difference is that the metanarratives of science and technology 
have been able to legitimize themselves through their own denotation to the exclusion of all other narratives which 
place things like moral traditions, tribal wisdom and even earlier philosophical prescriptions into incoherent 
positions. The postmodern condition is, then, a loss of narrative knowledge to the means of science since it will 
manifest as efficient production through its use of power - which leaves grand-narratives broken into many pieces of 
differing positions (think of too many language games, beliefs and viewpoints). The answer? It seems Lyotard 
moves to a position of relativism - the metanarratives of the past can no longer hold true. We can enter the age of the 
deliberate plurality of positions leading to localization of knowledge that will embrace diversity to generate new 
positions without succumbing to productivity. 
But Lyotard's text is philosophical and metaphorical at best, one whose message is largely propelled by the 
uniqueness of the declaration and ability of the writer to provide an imaginative account of the paradigm shifts of his 
generation. The book is still significant in challenging metanarratives and encouraging interdisciplinary perspective. 
That definition of postmodernism is offered in the intro., meaning that the body of this work is all an apologia 
articulating what Lyotard calls a report on knowledge. And make no mistake, that apologia is often dense to the 
point of inscrutability, making this a pretty tough read despite its length. But anyway, the thrust here is the argument 
that knowledge itself, from any discipline, has been separated from its referent, which is easier claimed than proved. 
Lyotard takes on science for the majority of his discussion, presumably because it's considered preeminently \"real\" 
or about \"real\" things, and shows how the realness of the real things science measures and proves and \"knows\" is 
based on language games that ostensibly operate to work toward consensus. By reducing science to a series of 
\"moves\" in a language game Lyotard also reduces reality to a web of intersecting consensual interlocutions about 
the nature of reality. (He never offers anything as helpful as an example, but I think it looks something like this: 
\"The sky is blue.\" \"Okay, I see that too, but what is blue?\" \"Blue is the sign we use to signify visible light of a 
wavelength between 450 and 495 nanometers.\" \"
